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Abstract 
This thesis examines the Malawi pension fund reform using an integrated simulation 
model. The aim is to explore why the Malawi government moved from Pay as you go 
(PAYG) system to define contribution (DC) system. Malawi is a relatively young country and 
its pension schemes are deficient in design, financing, execution and administration. Malawi 
has persistent macroeconomic fluctuations and an unstable financial sector that make 
effective pension fund management challenging. Also there are high inflation rates and 
politically motivated low-yield investment loans. 
The thesis assumes that in Malawi an average person retires by 50 years and the 
maximum age of death is 70. The average starting wage ranges from 65,000-75,000 Mk. The 
contribution rate is 15% of payroll with a transaction cost of 5% of wages. The common 
investment strategy is a 50-50-0-0-0 approach, i.e. 50% of assets are allocated to bank 
deposits and government bonds respectively. In addition a risk return analysis is employed to 
test the portfolio riskiness. The test include the Sharpe ratio, the Jensen measure and the 
Treynor measure. 
It was observed following the simulation tests that replacement rates are higher when 
retirement age rises to 60 or 65, but retiring at 50 had very low replacement rates. Meaning, 
pensioner can get favourable retirement income when he/she retires at 65 but this is a 
problem since life expectancy is 54 years. The portfolio risk test indicated very low results 
meaning low risks. This is as a result of allocating the funds in less risky assets i.e. 
government bonds which have low investments yield trickling down to low pensions. 
To improve the current pension system, Malawi needs to redesign its pension system to 
tackle the life expectancy problem, diversify pension fund portfolios to achieve a high and stable 
return, and invest in the economy in order to have a stable macro-economy that can protect the 
real value of pension assets. 
Keywords: Malawian pension reform, simulation, 50-50-0-0-0 approach 
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Resumo 
Esta tese examina o fundo de pensão de reforma do Malawi usando um modelo de 
simulação integrada. O objetivo é explorar por que o governo do Malawi passou do sistema 
Pay as you go  (repartição ) para um sistema  de contribuição definida (capitalização). 
Malawi é um país relativamente jovem e os seus regimes de pensões são deficientes em 
design, financiamentos, execução e administração. Malawi tem flutuações macroeconômicas 
persistentes e um sector financeiro instável que fazem a gestão eficaz de fundos de pensões 
desafiante. Além disso, existem altas taxas de inflação e politicamente motivadas 
empréstimos de investimento de baixo rendimento . 
A tese parte do princípio de que no Malawi uma pessoa média se aposenta aos  50 
anos e de que a idade máxima de morte é de 70 . O salário médio inicial varia de 65,000-
75,000 Mk. A taxa de contribuição é de 15% do salário, com um custo de transação de 5% 
dos salários. A estratégia comum de investimento é uma abordagem 50-50-0-0-0 , ou seja, 
50% dos activos são alocados para os depósitos bancários e títulos do governo, 
respetivamente. Além disso, uma análise de retorno de risco é utilizada para testar o grau de 
risco da carteira. O teste inclui o índice de Sharpe, a medida Jensen e a medida Treynor . 
Observou-se nos ensaios de simulação que as taxas de substituição são mais elevados 
quando a idade da reforma sobe para 60 ou 65 anos, mas se a reforma for aos 50 anos obtêm-
se taxas de substituição muito baixas. Ou seja, o pensionista pode obter uma pensão favorável 
quando se aposenta aos 65 anos , mas existe um problema, já que a expectativa média de vida 
é de 54 anos. O teste de risco da carteira dá resultados muito baixos indicando baixo risco. 
Este é o resultado da alocação dos recursos em ativos de menor risco, ou seja, títulos do 
governo, produzindo pensões baixas . 
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Para melhorar o actual sistema de pensões, Malawi precisa redesenhar o seu sistema 
de pensões para enfrentar o problema da expectativa de vida, diversificar carteiras dos fundos 
de pensões para conseguir um retorno alto e estável, e investir na economia, a fim de ter uma 
macroeconomia estável, que pode proteger o valor real dos ativos de pensões. 






















Dziwana M. Shawa Social Security System Reform: The Case of Malawi 
 
Acknowledgements  
I would like to take this opportunity to thank God for guiding me during my Master degree 
program. 
 
I express my outmost gratitude to my supervisor Maria Teresa Medeiros Garcia, for her 
tireless and indispensable guidance throughout this thesis preparation. 
 
I am indebted to my Parents and my siblings for their support during my academic journey. I 
am deeply honoured and blessed for having you in my life. 
 
Lastly my special thanks to all my friends and lecturers who guided me and helped me in 















Dziwana M. Shawa Social Security System Reform: The Case of Malawi 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
DB: Defined Benefit 
DC: Defined Contribution 
Khs: Kenya Shilling 
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NSO: National Statistics Office 
PAYG: Pay As You Go 
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 Accrual rate: The rate at which pension benefits builds up as member service is completed 
in a defined benefit plan. 
Accrued benefits: The amount of accumulated pension benefits of a pension plan member 
on the basis of years of service. 
Accumulated assets (Accumulation): The total value of assets accumulated in a pension 
fund. 
Active member: A pension plan member who is making contributions (and/or on behalf of 
whom contributions are being made) and is accumulating assets. 
Actuarial deficiency: In a situation when the actuarial value of a pension fund’s assets is less 
than the actuarial liability, the measure of this value. 
 Annuity: A form of financial contract mostly sold by life insurance companies that 
guarantees a fixed or variable payment of income benefit (monthly, quarterly, half-yearly, or 
yearly)for the life of a person(s) (the annuitant) or for a specified period of time. It is different 
than a life insurance contract which provides income to the beneficiary after the death of the 
insured. An annuity may be bought through instalments or as a single lump sum. Benefits 
may start immediately or at a pre-defined time in the future or at a specific age. 
Annuity rate: The present value of a series of payments of unit value per period payable to 
an individual that is calculated based on factors such as the mortality of the annuitant and the 
possible investment returns. 
                                                          
1
From: OECD (2005) Private Pension: OECD Classification and Glossary; World Bank 1994, Averting the Old Age 
Crisis and RBM (2011) Understanding pensions.  
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Asset allocation/ Portfolio: The spread of fund investments among different investment 
forms. 
Asset manager/ Investment manager: The individual(s) or entity (ies) endowed with the 
responsibility to physically invest the pension fund assets. Asset managers may also set out 
the investment strategy for a pension fund. 
Beneficiary: An individual who is entitled to a benefit (including the plan member and 
dependants).  
Contribution:  A payment made to a pension plan by a plan sponsor or a plan member. 
Contribution rate: The amount (typically expressed as a percentage of the contribution 
base) that is needed to be paid into the pension fund. 
Contributory pension scheme: A pension scheme where both the employer and the 
members have to pay into the scheme. 
Deferred pension: A pension arrangement in which a portion of an employee’s income is 
paid out at a date after which that income is actually earned. 
Deferred retirement: A situation when an individual decides to retire later and draw the 
pension benefits later than their normal retirement age. 
Defined benefit (DB): Occupational plans other than defined contributions plans. DB plans 
generally can be classified into one of three main types, “traditional”, “mixed” and “hybrid” 
plans.  
 “Traditional” DB plan: A DB plan where benefits are linked through a formula to the 
members' wages or salaries, length of employment, or other factors. 
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“Hybrid” DB plan: A DB plan where benefits depend on a rate of return credited to 
contributions, where this rate of return is either specified in the plan rules, independently of 
the actual return on any supporting assets (e.g. fixed, indexed to a market benchmark, tied to 
salary or profit growth, etc.), or is calculated with reference to the actual return of any 
supporting assets and a minimum return guarantee specified in the plan rules. 
“Mixed” DB plans: DB plans that has two separate DB and DC components but which are 
treated as part of the same plan. 
Defined contribution (DC): Occupational pension plans under which the plan sponsor pays 
fixed contributions and has no legal or constructive obligation to pay further contributions to 
an on-going plan in the event of unfavourable plan experience. 
Dependant: An individual who is financially dependent on a (passive or active) member of a 
pension scheme. 
Early retirement: A situation when an individual decides to retire earlier later and draw the 
pension benefits earlier than their normal retirement age. 
Fund member: An individual who is either an active (working or contributing, and hence 
actively accumulating assets) or passive (retired, and hence receiving benefits), or deferred 
(Holding deferred benefits) participant in a pension plan. 
Funded pension plans: Occupational or personal pension plans that accumulate dedicated 
assets to cover the plan's liabilities. 
Funding: The act of accumulating assets, in order to finance the pension plan. 
Indexation: The method with which pension benefits are adjusted to take into account 
changes in the cost of living (e.g. prices and/or earnings). 
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Individual pension funds: A pension fund that comprises the assets of a single member and 
his/her beneficiaries, usually in the form of an individual account. 
Mandatory occupational pension plans: Participation in these plans is mandatory for 
employers. Employers are obliged by law to participate in a pension plan. Employers must set 
up (and make contributions to) occupational pension plans which employees will normally be 
required to join. Where employers are obliged to offer an occupational pension plan, but the 
employees' membership is on a voluntary basis, these plans are also considered mandatory. 
Mandatory personal pension plans: These are personal plans that individuals must join or 
which are eligible to receive mandatory pension contributions. Individuals may be required to 
make pension contributions to a pension plan of their choice normally within a certain range 
of choices or to a specific pension plan. 
Minimum pension/ benefit: The minimum level of pension benefits the plan pays out in all 
circumstances. 
Mortality table: A chart showing rate of death at each age. Unisex mortality table 
Non-contributory pension scheme: A pension scheme where the members do not have to 
pay into the scheme. 
Normal retirement age: Age from which the individual is eligible for pension benefits. 
Participant: Fund member 
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) plan:  Funded pension plans usually paid in the recurrent budget 
of a nation/ firm. 
Pensioner/ Retiree: Pension fund member who has retired and is receiving pension benefits 
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Pension funds: The pool of assets forming an independent legal entity that are bought with 
the contributions to a pension plan for the exclusive purpose of financing pension plan 
benefits. The plan/fund members have a legal or beneficial right or some other contractual 
claim against the assets of the pension fund. Pension funds take the form of either a special 
purpose entity with legal personality (such as a trust, foundation, or corporate entity) or a 
legally separated fund without legal personality managed by a dedicated provider (pension 
fund Management Company) or other financial institution on behalf of the plan/fund 
members. 
Pension Benefit: Payment made to a pension fund member (or dependants) after retirement. 
Pension fund administrator: The individual(s) ultimately responsible for the operation and 
oversight of the pension fund. 
Pension fund governance: The operation and oversight of a pension fund. The governing 
body is responsible for administration, but may employ other specialists, such as actuaries, 
custodians, consultants, asset managers and advisers to carry out specific operational tasks  
Or to advise the plan administration or governing body. 
Pension contracts: Contracts that specify pension plans contributions to an undertaking in 
exchange for which the pension plan benefits will be paid when the members reach a 
specified retirement age or on earlier exit of members from the plan. Most countries limit the 
integration of pension plans only into pension funds, as the financial vehicle of the pension 
plan. Other countries also consider the pension insurance contract as the financial vehicle for 
pension plans. 
Pension plan: A legally binding contract having an explicit retirement objective (or – in 
order to satisfy tax-related conditions or contract provisions –the benefits cannot be paid at all 
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or without a significant penalty unless the beneficiary is older than a legally defined 
retirement age). This contract may be part of a broader employment contract, it may be set 
forth in the plan rules or documents, or it may be required by law. In addition to having an 
explicit retirement objective, pension plans may offer additional benefits, such as disability, 
sickness, and survivors’ benefits. 
Pension scheme: Pension funds /Pension plan 
Pensionable age: Normal retirement age 
Personal pension plans: Access to these plans does not have to be linked to an employment 
relationship. The plans are established and administered directly by a pension fund or a 
financial institution acting as pension provider without any intervention of employers. 
Individuals independently purchase and select material aspects of the arrangements. The 
employer may nonetheless make contributions to personal pension plans. Some personal 
plans may have restricted membership. 
Projected Benefit/Accumulated Pension Benefit: The actuarial present value of vested and 
non-vested benefits attributed to the plan through the pension benefit formula for service 
rendered to that date based on employees’ future salary levels. 
Public pension funds: Pension funds that are regulated under public sector law. 
Public pension plans: Social security and similar statutory programmes administered by the 
general government (that is central, state, and local governments, as well as other public 
sector bodies such as social security institutions). Public pension plans have been 
traditionally PAYG financed, but some OECD countries have partial funding of public 
pension liabilities or have replaced these plans by private pension plans. 
Rate of return: The income earned by holding an asset over a specified period. 
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Replacement rate: The ratio of an individual’s (or a given population’s) (average) pension 
in a given time period and the (average) income in a given time period. 
Underfunding: The situation when the value of a plan’s assets, are less than its liabilities, 
thereby having an actuarial deficiency. 
Voluntary contribution: An extra contribution paid in addition to the mandatory 
contribution a member can pay to the pension fund in order to increase the future pension 
benefits. 
Wage indexation: The method with which pension benefits are adjusted taking into account 
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Pension schemes in most African nations; suffer from a series of significant weaknesses 
reflecting deficiencies in their design, financing and administration. Macroeconomic 
fluctuations, political interference and the instability of the financial sector negatively affect 
pension fund management. There is evidence of declining revenue from contributions due to 
unemployment and insolvency in the private sector as well as retrenchments and budgetary 
constraints in the public sector. The real value of reserves is eroded through high inflation 
rates and the channelling of resources into politically motivated low-yield investments and 
loans. It has become evident that the social security system is not able to provide adequate 
levels of income at old age. The reform of unsustainable pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
systems can help reduce the fiscal burden that such schemes place on the population, and 
indeed avoid burdening future generations. Such concerns are greatest in countries with high 
levels of labour market informality, as is the case in developing countries in Africa and 
elsewhere (Stewart and Yermo. 2009). As a result most African nations have decided to 
reform their public pension system to private pension system. This move may not only 
provide income at old age but it may develop the capital markets, reduce government pension 
debt, and encourage financial investment and economic growth. 
The current study focuses on the social security system reforms that occurred in Malawi 
since 2011. Malawi like many countries restructured its pension scheme from a public PAYG 
to a private mandatory Defined Contribution (DC) pension system with the aim of improving 
the deficiencies of its pension schemes. The aim is to invest the pension contributions in the 
capital market with the desire to improve the macroeconomic instability and government 
pension debt. Financial theory postulates that for an economy to experience macroeconomic 
stability it must invest in its economy. While this is beneficial to the economy, Welfare 
Economists argues that investing pension contributions in financial markets exposes the 




pensioner to risks (Lange, 2010). The risks can occur when there is poor investment, and poor 
performance of the financial market. When a loss occurs, fund managers transfer the risks to 
pensioners who in return receive less than expected and sometimes nothing at all.  This thesis 
aims at analysing the sustainability of the pension reform by examining the advantages and 
disadvantages of the reform. 
 Malawi has never conducted a comprehensive study on its pension systems and pension 
reform. This could be due to lack of knowledge, lack of data and lack of political will. This 
study aims to provide an understanding into the reasons why the Malawi government has 
decided to reform its pensions, how it will function and the challenges that it faced in the 
PAYG pension system. The purpose of this study is not to provide a complete survey of the 
reform, but to highlight the benefits, limitations, operations and expected performance of the 
reform in ensuring retirement income, reducing government pension debt and improving 
macroeconomic instability. 
Malawi’s move from PAYG to private pension has been greatly influenced by its need to 
improve its economic performance, social welfare and its pension system that is financially 
unsustainable. McCarthy and Zheng (1996) point out that pension funds growth could be 
made more sustainable by increasing GDP, raising contribution rates or gradually reducing 
benefit rates. But the financial costs and social obstacles of those reform options must be 
assessed. Fully funded, privately managed pension schemes might be feasible. This study 
using an integrated simulation model will investigate the cost of supporting the pension 
reform, and the impact of different reform options and pension arrangements can bring 
positive economic growth. The goal is to identify the challenges the Malawi government will 
face in managing pension reform in the long run and whether the reforms are macro 
economically sound. 




This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 will provide a brief literature and empirical 
review discussing country case studies. The aim is to provide scientific rationale and study 
significance. Chapter 3 will include the pension framework, Methods and Data. This chapter 
will represent the empirical model that will be used to analyse the study, relating to the 
literature review. It will present data available that will be used in the analysis and how it was 
collected and sampling methods used. Chapter 4 will provide an analysis of the model and the 
data used with the help of graphs and tables. Lastly Chapter 5 will include the conclusion, 






















2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The following literature review considers the theoretical foundations of the study. In 
discussing the conceptual framework for the study it was necessary to review other similar 
studies and various theoretical models pertinent to this study. The review will be structured as 
follows: theoretical models & approaches and similar studies carried out in other countries 
namely: South Africa, Chile, Kenya, Nigeria and China.  
2.1. Theoretical models and approach 
This study on pension reforms was underpinned by various theories and approaches 
that together offer a holistic appraisal. There are many theories and approaches that can 
potentially guide this area of concern. This study focused on pension reforms in Malawi 
which is a developing country. Hence the theoretical paradigms adopted to deepen the 
understanding of the situation include: Welfare economic approach and Theory of Finance. 
2.1.1 Welfare economic theory of social security 
 Lange (2010) states that welfare economic theory is concerned with the conditions 
which determine the total economic welfare of a community. It is concerned with how 
economies use policies to improve the wellbeing of its citizens. One way is by ensuring that 
citizens have financial security at old age and social protection. One of the policies an 
economy uses is social policy. Hill (1997) argues that social policy is concerned with 
housing, social security education and health. Social security can be grouped in three 
categories: contributory benefits, non-contributory benefits which are not means-tested but 
are contingent upon an individual being in a specific category like a child or disabled and 
lastly means tested benefits. Pension forms part of the social security that is contributory and 
it is imperative that the government should establish frame works in which they should 
operate. Barr (1993) suggests that government can achieve this by using two options. The 
first is the PAYG system where the government taxes its current workers and uses the 
proceeds to pay pensioners. The limitations are that, with time the aging community grows at 




an exponentially high rate than the working generation. This in return puts a strain on the 
economy and the working generations end up suffering by paying high taxes while the 
retirees receive low pension benefits. In addition the PAYG is prone to high political 
interference especially in developing countries. To improve on this Barr, advocates for 
governments to increase the retirement age. This approach is however impractical for most 
developing economies since most of them have very low life expectancies.  Secondly, Barr 
argues for a voluntary private pension, where the working generation contributes a fraction of 
their salary in a pension fund to fund their retirement. This is ideal for developing economies 
in that it reduces pressure on government pension expenses, increases economic stability 
through the fund’s investment and it is free of political-interference. Care however should be 
considered since the financial investments are subjected to financial risk and if pension 
benefits are not invested in profitable portfolios would lead to income loss. It is therefore 
important for government to pay attention to its pension system and ensure that its social 
security system is not eroded and that additional burden should not be placed on the state.  
2.1.2   Financial theory of Efficient Markets and Pension Savings 
 Elton et al (2011) indicates that, efficient markets mean that security prices fully 
reflect all available information. All riskless investment in the efficient market must have a 
zero net present value at the time an investment is made. To decrease investing in risky 
portfolios financial theory argues that we must invest in portfolios with low standard 
deviation. Markowitz portfolio selection model suggest that this is achievable by diversifying 
investments and in return leads to portfolios with high expected returns and low standard 
deviation. It is assumed that investors will invest their saving only in portfolios with high 
expected returns. The aim is to earn high income in the future. Altman (2008) argues that as 
economies grow, the population grows with it. The older are living longer and the cost of 
supporting them is rising. If economies wish to reduce the substantial rise of elderly living in 




poverty they must employ policies that focus on ensuring that individuals save more money 
while they are economically active.  
The pension reform of Malawi thus aims at encouraging people to save more as they work. 
This is characterised by defined contribution. However for it to work members need an 
extensive knowledge of financial concepts especially risks associated with various asset 
classes. Members need to understand their risk profiles and savings behaviour. The financial 
out-come is that firms would offload their contingent liabilities and members would acquire 
investment risk. Secondly there is need to encourage employers to provide high contribution 
to occupational pensions. The third need is to spend more public money on pensions and 
pensioners. The second and third aforementioned needs are normally incorporated in PAYG. 
However in the case of Malawi, increasing pensions led to high taxes for current workers. 
Even with the increased taxes poor management of the pension fund led to misallocations of 
the proceeds. The Nation Online estimated that between 2005-2009, 3.5 thousand pensioners 
were unpaid. As previously mentioned another strategy would be encouraging individuals to 
stay in the labour force longer, which would lead to workers saving more before they retire. 
This is not ideal for Malawi since life expectancy is very low at a rate between 54.14- 55 
years (figure 14). 
2.2Country pension profiles 
The countries that will be looked at are South Africa, Chile, Kenya, Nigeria and China. 
These countries have been chosen because; according to the World Bank and UNDP when 
they started their pension reforms, they had similar population structure to that of Malawi in 
that 50% or more of its citizens lived in rural areas and were poor (World Bank, 2010). 
Majority of the population were the youth and had high unemployment. They have 
experienced pension reforms in the past 20 years. Their GDP growth rate was less than 10% 
and inflation was higher than 4%. They experience similar social security problems i.e. high 




unemployment, high income disparities, high birth & mortality rates and low wage levels 
(UNDP, 2013). Most of their pension system wasn’t adequate in providing income to the 
growing elderly population. They moved from a public PAYG system to a private DC and 
took similar approaches to reform their pension funds that Malawi is embarking on. Their 
Pension reform structure is similar to what Malawi is trying to do and in addition South 
Africa, Nigeria and China have taken a big role in providing experts in improving the pension 
system and investing in financial market in Malawi. 
2.2.1 South African Case 
In South African the pension system follow a three pillar regime just like that of Malawi, 
the first being old age pension, which is the main source of income for 75% of the elderly. 
The second pillar comprises of various pension designs which are associated with the formal 
sector employment in either private or public. Between1980-90 South Africa had PAYG 
pension system. Just like Malawi, South Africa’s pension policy was supply driven and 
served political ends. A qualitative study by the South African financial board in the 90s 
indicated  that large numbers of elderly & pensioners lived in poverty and benefited little 
from the PAYG system that faced a lot of political inter-ference, corruption and 
mismanagement. The study recommended a reform from PAYG to a privately owned DC 
plan. This then produced an additional voluntary occupational pension system and voluntary 
personal savings arrangements. Barrientos and Sherloc (2008) in their study noted that the 
Pensions reforms in South Africa had a significant impact on reducing poverty among older 
people and their households over the years. Analysis of household poverty status between 
2002 and 2008 shows a high incidence of movement in and out of poverty among the elderly 
at 43 per cent in a six-year period. Malawi should draw lessons from the South African 
phenomenon since the aim of the reform is to reduce poverty among pensioners.  




2.2.2 Chilean Case 
Between 1980 and 1981 the Chilean government introduced a pensions based on 
individual capital accounts i.e. the value of the pension depends on funds accumulated and 
the rate of return. The new regime considers three types of pensions: old age, disability and 
survivor pension. Just like the pension reform in Malawi, when an individual retires, he has 
two options: he can buy a life annuity from an insurance company with the accumulated 
funds or make scheduled monthly withdrawals from his account.  Both nations’ aim is to 
reduce old age poverty. In 2006, a diagnosis of the Chilean system revealed that a significant 
portion of the population lacked sufficient funds to support themselves during old age. There 
were personal pension gaps, which are closely associated with informal sector and low paid 
jobs, they’re also associated with younger workers, married women and the self-employed. 
These gaps in coverage will lead to poverty and hardship for the elderly population and 
inflated future government welfare expenditure. To fix this the government introduced a 
Pension Reform Law No. 20,255 in 2008. The act indicated the self-employed should have 
mandatory contribution (Júaregui, 2010). Malawi just like Chile is an economy where 50% or 
more of its employees are the youth, 54 % of its population have low incomes (World Bank, 
2012). Therefore Malawi can use some of the solutions employed by Chile as a guide in 
developing the pension reform. Malawi should expect that approximately after 25 years of 
implementation, the pension reform challenges experienced by Chile in 2006 might crop up 
and thus must be ready to solve them.   
2.2.3 Kenyan case 
Kenya in 2006 introduced voluntary membership and contributions with the aim of 
securing pension for the informal sector. The statutory contributions to the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) are set at 15%. The employee pays half and the other half is paid by 
the employer. A lump sum benefits can be given on retirement at or after age 50, earlier 
invalidity, on permanent emigration and to survivors on death of a member. In 2003 a study 




was conducted to measure the effects of the new pension reform through portfolio weighting 
in land and property assets. It was noted that the level of contributors rose from 750,000 to 1 
million which resulted in economic improvement. However the level of benefits outgo 
remained static at just over Ksh 2billion, reflecting a combination of a decrease in early 
withdrawals as well as the impact on benefit outgo of the lower allocation of interest to 
members’ individual accounts ( Raichura, 2008).  
2.2.4 Nigerian Case 
Dostal´s paper on Nigerian Pension Reform 2004-2010 analyses early results of the 2004 
Nigerian pension reform. He pointed that in 2010, the pension system was privately managed 
and funded pension accounts covered around four million Nigerians in the country with a 
workforce of around 50 million people. The study focuses on shortcomings of the new 
system. The study demonstrates in a model calculation using GDP per capita and the 
development of financial markets as indexes in measuring the funded accounts performance. 
This measure was used because most of the contributions were invested in the financial 
market. This so far produced negative real returns for pension savers. Most crucially, the 
reform has failed to contribute to basic social security in old age for the majority of Nigerians 
employed in the informal sector.  Placing these individual accounts in financial markets only 
increases public debt. Thus, agreeing with academic literature which offers no support for 
funded pensions in the context of developing countries with low GDP (Davis 1995, ch.11; 
Barr and Diamond 2008, 94-110, 159-73; Barr and Diamond 2009, 24-25). This should raise 
concern on the sustainability of the reform in Malawi. The mistake that the Nigerian 
government did was lack of portfolio diversification, lack of management accountability and 
pension savers had little knowledge of financial markets.  




2.2.5 Chinese Case 
 Hu (2006) borrowed the model of McCarthy and Zheng (1996), Cairns (2003) and the 
OECD (2011, 2005), which used empirical simulation investigation of the impacts of several 
policy options. i.e. changes in contribution rates, alternative pension fund investments, 
changes in retirement ages and transaction costs. To study China´s move from the public pay 
as you go pension system which was basically catering to people in cities and towns to 
private sector managed pension. This was the case because pension contributions were 
invested in financial Markets by the private pension funds. Malawi is expected to employ the 
same strategy since the only way for pension savings to grow is to invest them in the Market.  
Hu found that increase in contribution rate would raise the replacement rate. Raising the 
retirement age led to an effective impact i.e. enhancing the replacement rate nearly 3 times, if 
the worker serves 10 more years. This policy, however, is likely to provoke resistance from 
the public, like in the UK (Turner 2005); therefore, if this option is considered, the increase 
should consider match demographic changes. The impacts of different transaction costs on 
the benefits are quite large as well. This was also the same in Malawi in 2010 when the 
pension bill was being discussed in parliament and the retirement age was increased from 55 
to 60. This caused mass demonstrations to the point that the retirement age was then reduced 
to 50.  
 This study by making appropriate adjustments will borrow from the model used by 
Hu. This model is ideal for the study because: the study will use quantitative research 
methods to make simulation for future pensions Hu also used the same.  
 A similar methodology was used by OECD in 2011, 2005 and 2001, where they looked at 
how retirement benefits from mandatory public pensions change with different assumptions, 
e.g. level of individual earning and return on DC pensions. The model is flexible, easy and 
simple in that it used different assumption to calculate pension funds. 




3.  The Frame work of Social Security System in Malawi 
3.1 Labour Force Structure 
 Malawi is a country with a population estimated at 15.38 million as of 2013 (Table II) 
with a labour force close to 6.71 million (table III). This labour force has gradually been 
rising from 3.7 million in 1990 to the current rate. The GDP per capita was estimated to be 
918 PPP dollars (Table II). To provide an overview of the structure and recent performance 
of Malawi‘s economy, Table II shows the distribution of the main economic sectors and their 
growth rates. By far the largest sector is the agricultural sector accounting for 30% of GDP.  
This sector provides jobs to about 90% of the work force (86% of which are subsistence 
farmers). Most of these farmers are self-employed and do not see the importance of investing 
in a private pension.  It is argued that most farmers perceive it as a waste of viable resources 
which can be diverted to the expansion of their business. This could be due to lack of 
knowledge, lack of government will and poor execution of pension schemes. This results in 
90% of the retired population not having pension schemes (Table III). In this table it can be 
seen that in 1990 the percentage of retired population with no pension schemes is 91%. The 
rate slightly decreased in 2009 to 89% and 86% in 2012. This could be attributed to changes 
in pension regulations and increased political will.  
3.2 Pension Structure 
Malawi developed its first pension schemes in 1944 under the Malawi Public Service 
Regulations Act which was later reformed in 1991.  With the guidance of this act Malawi 
developed 3 types of pension schemes which included: 
3.2.1 The Public Pension Scheme: 
This is a Civil Service Pension Scheme (CSPS) operated by the Government of Malawi. This 
is a non-contributory defined benefit (DB), pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system paid to employees 
at the mandatory retirement age of 60 and following 10 years of service or earlier following 
20 years of service. Pensions are paid out of a consolidated fund, from recurrent expenditure. 




The proportion is normally calculated on the basis of number of pensioners and pension 
arrears. The pension accrues at a rate of 1/360 of pensionable salary for each completed 
month of service. The final salary forms the base for calculating pensions. Tax deduction of 
2% of total entitlements is levied on early retirees. The Retirement benefit comprised of 
lifetime pension and lump sum gratuity. The gratuity is paid at a minimum of 5 years in 
service. The retirement benefit comprised of 75% of total terminal accrued benefits, whereas 
gratuity consisted of the remaining 25%. In the fund two main contingencies are covered: old 
age and a death gratuity (Finmark, 2010). 
3.2.2 Occupational Mandatory: 
This is the second pension scheme that was supported by the Malawi Public Service 
Regulations Act. This scheme is offered voluntarily through privately managed occupational 
schemes. The pension schemes are registered with the Commissioner of Taxes of the Malawi 
Revenue Authority (Kazeze). It was estimated in 2010 that there were around 399 private 
pension funds offering both DB and defined contribution (DC) pension schemes with total 
assets of around MK35 billion ($250 million) or more (RBM, Malawi). These pension 
schemes were handled and managed by private pension administrators. Each used their own 
formula, contribution & transaction rates plus each had its own regulations. 
3.2.3 Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme: 
The third pension scheme was a pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS). This began in 
Mchinji District in 2006 and was later extended to 6 more districts by the end of 2008. By 
2009 the scheme covered 14.5 thousand households of the elderly who received on average 
MK 1800 ($13) a month. This however was not sufficient since the total elderly population is 
approximated at 520 thousand (Finmark, 2010).  
 
 




3.2.4 Limitations of the old pension scheme 
This public pension had two main problems. Firstly, decline in revenue contributions due 
to unemployment, retrenchments and budgetary constraints in the public sector. Secondly, the 
real value of the reserves has been eroded through high inflation rates and the channelling of 
resources into politically motivated low-yield investment and loans under the previous 
government. The amount of benefit payout had been rising over the years and this inflated 
government debt and caused a strain on the economy. Table I below shows the defined-
benefit schemes for public sector employees were running high actuarial deficits and had 
accumulated substantial arrears in benefit payments. The highest deficit was of MK 3 billion 
in 2012/2013 financial year. Table II indicates how macro economically unstable the 
economy was with high government spending of MK 49 million ($147.5 thousand), low GDP 
of $5.7 billion, high inflation and negative balance of trade trends etc. Additionally Figure 1 
brings into picture how GDP levels were fairing with the highest being 9.8 in 2009 and the 
lowest 3.3 in 2006. Instability of the financial sector also negatively affected pension fund 
management. Insolvency in the private sector as well as retrenchments and the real value of 
the reserves has been eroded through high inflation rates of up to 44.759% in 1999 (Table 
VIII). The real rate of return was highly negative during 1998-2004, as low as -25% for 
members' balances and somewhat less negative on fund assets (Dick & Mussa, 2010). The 
income ceilings applied in the calculation of pension contributions had not been adjusted 
regularly for inflation. Because of high inflation rates, the ceiling fell to the equivalent of 
US$20 in 2000. This resulted in very low, practically flat-rate contributions of only MK. 
1,500 or US$4 per month to members' accounts. There was poor participation in the pension 
schemes in the all sectors namely the public sector, private sector and informal sector. Table 
III illustrates the distribution of the labour force how the number of pensioners in the civil 
service and private sector is unbalanced. The table shows that a large number of the labour 
force is employed in the private sector compared to the civil service. The main phenomenon 




is that Malawi is an agricultural dependent country and 75% of the population is employed in 
the informal agricultural market. This has trickled down to a large percentage of retirees with 
no pension with the highest being in 1996 of 92.02%. This is a big challenge for Malawi. 
Figure II illustrates this issue better through a chart with the average percentages of retirees 
without pension at a high rate of 90%. This indicated inadequate management of pension 
fund operations and lack of pension regulations means most employees in the agricultural 
sector do not have proper pension coverage. Hence a reform was needed to help reduce the 
pension debt.  
3.2.5 Pension Reforms 
Pension reforms started to occur in 2004 when the basic wage rose by 100%. Pension 
accrual rate was then adjusted from 1/360 (3.3%) to two differing rates of 2.2% for senior 
staff and 2.5 % for junior staff. Prior to 2004, every employee was paid a lump sum gratuity 
and a reduced pension. The new system allowed employees to opt to get a full pension 
without gratuity or get a gratuity of up to 25% plus a reduced pension, but with interest of 
4%. In 2009, this 4% discount rate was reduced to 2%. Pension benefits were adjusted to an 
inflation rate of 10%. The government revised the mandatory retiring age for Civil servants 
from 55 years to 60 years in 2006 (Finmark, 2010). However this did not solve the pension 
deficit problem. The participation level of individuals in pension systems was still erratic and 
government was still in pension debt.   
By 2010 the government decided to move from a public PAYG to a private mandatory 
defined contribution pension scheme. 
In 2011 Malawi pension act was established and it categorised pension into three basic 
pillars: a poverty prevention pillar where the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme lies. A 
mandatory contribution pillar and a voluntary savings pillar where public and private 
employees can use. The act stipulates that, a National Pension fund (NPF) and a National 




pension administrator (NPA) operating as independent bodies are to be established. 
Employees and employers can make mandatory contributions to the NPF and it will receive, 
monitor and disperse the pension benefits. The NPA will act as a regulatory board and 
controlling body of pension fund providers.  The NPF will offer limited administration, 
investment, and other auxiliary services to private pension funds administrators and 
investment managers.  
Pension schemes will be of defined contribution, defined benefit, or a hybrid of the two. 
Under the new law, all defined benefit schemes have to be fully funded. Currently all pension 
schemes are defined contribution. 
The act indicates that employer´s contribution would be 10% of the pensionable salary while 
the employee´s contribution is 5% of the pensionable salary. Employers with less than five 
employees and with a minimum annual income of less than MWK 120,000 (USD 300-500) 
are exempted. The retirement age is now 50 from 55 and the minimum years of service is 
now 20 from 25. On retirement, members may access 40% of their benefits as a lump sum 
while the rest should be used to buy an annuity or arrange a programmed withdrawal with a 
pension fund. There are approximately, 337,000 people in the Malawian civil service and 
around 30,000 retirees (Finmark Malawi, 2010). With the pension act in place pension funds 
have grown tremendously. Tables IV to VII provide a detailed outlook of private pension 
funds. In the figures 2011 saw an increase in pension funds of 55.6%, pension members 
increased by 39.9%, contributions by 47.3% and pension assets rose from Mk 59512.8 to Mk 
67666.4 
3.2.6 Structure of the Pension Reform Portfolio and its Financing Vehicle 
 The insurance industry plays an important role in the administration of pension fund 
investments in Malawi. Table IV shows the composition of those administrators with Old 
mutual life holding the highest value. Most of the government pension systems are also 




expected to be managed by these firms. The capital market in Malawi is not well developed 
and it has been faced with poor economic performance, lack of sophistication and expertise.  
All pension funds are closed ended. The aim of the pension reform is to boost the economy 
and financial sector of Malawi, and with that in mind most fund managers are only willing to 
invest in portfolios that are considered to provide guaranteed return. Hence most portfolios 
are 50% bonds and 50% bank deposits and sometimes 100% bonds.  
3. 3 Methods and Data 
3.3.1 Research design 
 In this section, reports on the empirical simulation investigation of the impacts of 
several policy options on the pension system. The policy options include changes in 
contribution rates, alternative pension fund investments, changes in retirement ages and 
transaction costs. By employing a stochastic simulation technique, it is hoped to demonstrate 
the quantitative extent to which the changes in those variables impact on the pension benefits. 
The analysis is based on the purely funded model. In addition the study will examine the 
investment performance and risk measures associated with the investment portfolios using 
total returns. The aim is to calculate the profitability of the pension investment portfolio. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
3.3.2.1 Simulation Model 
 The model used is the same as the one used by Hu (2006), Cairns (2003) and 
McCarthy and Zheng (1996) and it is as follows: 
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In Equation 1, P is the balance of pension fund accumulation, C is the contribution rate, W 
income or wage, TC the transaction cost and r the annual rate of investment returns. A is the 
pension payment and ᴫ the inflation rate in Equation 2. 




The study assumes a person starts working at the age of y1, retires at y2 and dies at y3, t and 
γ denote the time dimension. The average age a person starts working is assumed to be 22 in 
Malawi. A similar methodology was used by OECD (2005d), where they looked at how 
retirement benefits from mandatory public pensions change with different assumptions, e.g. 
level of individual earning and return on DC pensions. In addition, their simulation analysis 
included work relating to both DC and DB components (Hu 2006). 
Equation 1 above mathematically describes the asset accumulation process of a person from 
the time he/she starts working at y1 to the time he/she finishes working at y2. Equation 2 is 
concerned with pension fund decumulation during the postretirement period from y2+1 to y3. 
We assume that pension payment is linked to inflation; therefore an inflation variable ᴫ is 
included into the equation. To be consistent with the fully funded nature of the pension 
scheme our model in the end year assumes a balance of pension assets should not be greater 
than zero and ideally equal to zero. Therefore the interest of pensioners is maximised if the 
account balance is zero, i.e. Py3 = 0 when the person dies. In order to derive the function of 
Py3in terms of variables we are interested in, we expand Equations 1 and 2, by undertaking 
the mathematical manipulations as follows: 
Substituting t = y2 +1and t = y2 + 2 into Equation 2 respectively, we have 
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Substituting equation 3 into 4 we get the following: 
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Based on Equations 3 and 6 we can identify that both equations are a geometric series with 
the number of terms determined by time t. Therefore we write down equations of Pt when t = 
y2 + 3 and t = y3 accordingly 
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If we set Equation 8 equal to zero and undertake some manipulation, the value of A could be 
calculated as follows: 
  
                                         
                                  
    
               
  
      
   (9) 
Given the value of A we can easily compute replacement rates by dividing A by wages of the 
year before retirement. 
3.3.2.2 Returns 
In the portfolio the returns are analysed using annual pension returns as follows: 
       
  
    
  
The Market return is calculated in a similar way as follows: 
       
   
     
  
The risk free rate for assets will be calculated using the RBM annual return data bank and 
using the formula Elton et al used in his book which is: 
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3.3.2.3 Risk 
 In order to understand the performance of investment portfolios, Modern portfolio 
theory argues that there is need to measure the risks associated with the portfolio returns. The 
theory points two risk measures and one diversification measure. These are: 
Systematic Risk - These are market risks that cannot be diversified away. Interest rates, 
recessions and wars are examples of systematic risks and it is measured by the beta of each 
scheme. This is calculated as indicated above. 
Unsystematic Risk - Also known as "specific risk", this risk is specific to individual 
investments and can be diversified away as you increase the number of investments in your 
portfolio. This is measured by standard deviation computed as 
    
          
 
    
   
                                 
Diversification measure- portfolio diversification is important and it improves the 
performance of a portfolio. This is measured through a coefficient of determination which is 
R². 
3.3.2.4 Performance Measures 
3.3.2.4.1 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio characterizes how well the return of an asset compensates the investor for 
the risk taken. When comparing two assets versus a common benchmark, the one with a 
higher Sharpe ratio provides better return for the same risk. This is measured as the excess 
return (or risk premium) per unit of deviation in an investment asset or a trading strategy, 




typically referred to as risk. This is computed as:     
     
  
  
                                    
                                           
3.3.2.4.2 Treynor Ratio 
This is the measurement of the returns earned in excess of that which could have been earned 
on an investment that has no diversifiable risk (e.g., Treasury Bills or a completely 
diversified portfolio), per each unit of market risk assumed. This is computed as:  
   
     
  
                                         
3.3.2.4.3 Jensen Measure 
This is a risk-adjusted performance measure that represents the average return on a portfolio 
over and above that predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), given the 
portfolio's beta and the average market return. Hence it measures the relationship between 
portfolio returns and its expected returns. This is computed as follows:  
                               
3.4 Data Collection 
All data of asset returns, inflation rates and GDP are given in Table VIII. This simulation 
work, uses 5 different assets, i.e. bank deposits, government bonds, T bills, domestic equities 
and global investments. Regarding data source and observation period regarding inflation 
rates and Rates of returns on bank deposits were from RBM database (2013), Government 
bond yields from IMF, Returns on domestic equity from Malawi stock exchange. Returns on 
global investment were derived from returns on global equity yields and global bond yields 
with a 50-50 split, as in Davis (2002a, 2002b). Global returns were corrected by allowing for 
currency risk. Table IX provide wage averages for 2011/2012 obtained from ministry of 
labour and NSO.  




3.5 Data Analysis and Verification 
Looking at figure 3 domestic equities have been rising this is due to the persistent devaluation 
of the Malawi kwacha by the government. In figure 4 global investments are fluctuating and 
performing poorly. This can be attributed to the financial crisis. Wages (W) are defined as the 
annual real income after inflation rates are considered. The inflation rate is proxied by the 
consumer price index (CPI). The transaction cost (TC) is defined as a proportion of wages. In 
the paper, in order to assess the impacts of different rates of transaction costs on the 
contributions, we used 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. The rates are chosen based on the 
operations of the pension fund markets and the median rate of 10% is taken from the paper by 
(Whitehouse 2000) where administrative charges are compared across both OECD and 
developing countries. The contribution rates are assumed to be at the level of 10%, 15% and 
20%. These contribution rates are used to determine how current pension system can perform 
if contribution rates change and the median rate is taken from the according to the 
requirements of the pension act. The study uses return data for seven different portfolios, 
which are constructed from our historical and simulated data series. Portfolio 1 refers to a 
portfolio consisting of bank deposits only, portfolio 2 government bonds only, portfolio 3 T 
bills only, portfolio 4 domestic stocks only and portfolio 5 global investments only. Portfolio 
6 is a “naïve” portfolio with five types of assets allocated equally (20-20-20-20-20), i.e. bank 
deposits 20%, government bonds 20%, T bills 20%, domestic stocks 20% and global 
investment 20%. Portfolio 7 consists of 50% bank deposits and 50% government bonds
2
, 
which is consistent with pension fund investment practice in Malawi. In the simulation work, 
we assume that a representative person starts working at the age of 22 in 2011
3
. 2011 is the 
year pension reform started. We also assume that the person maximum years to live is 2059 
                                                          
2
Malawi pension funds are heavily invested in bank deposits and government bonds. This is for two reasons. One is the 
investment mandate of pension funds where low risk assets are always recommended to be the main investment vehicles, the 
other is because of underdeveloped financial markets. 
 
3
In Malawi a person usually starts school at 6 years old and attends primary for 8 years, then 4 years of high school and may 
continue to 4 years of university study and by the time they finish university they are usually 22 years old. 




making the maximum age of death 70. Given that we only have data observations up to 2013, 
observations from 2013 to 2059 have to be simulated first. As for wages, the annual growth 
rate is estimated to be 3%. The simulation of inflation rates is based on the assumption that 
these rates are normally distributed; therefore we simulate the data from 2014 to 2059 by 
using the historical mean and standard deviation. The simulation of rate of returns on all 
seven portfolios are conducted in the same way as that in the inflation rates, i.e. using 
historical mean and standard deviation to simulate observations from 2014 to 2051. For the 
simulations, we used the full sample of these variables as shown in Table VIII. All 
simulations were programmed and conducted with R i386 3.0.1  
3.6 Limitations of the study 
The present study has the following limitations: 
All the data used to determine the sustainability of the reform is simulated data 
because comprehensive data is not yet available. This means the future data might not 
necessarily be the same as the simulated data. 
This study considered schemes with the same goal, risk profile and similar investments 
this may generate misleading results. Many of the pension plans favour T bill and bonds since 
they consider them risk free
4
.  
The observed data doesn’t include effects of subscription and withdrawal commissions of 
portfolio’s return and in some years data is not available this present a problem in data 
consistency. 
The study only looked at themes that are currently tradable. Meaning it ignored 
liquidated or absorbed funds. This may present sample bias. 
 
 
                                                          
4
Economic theory and macro finance favour government bonds and T bills arguing that they are AAA rated and are free of 
risk. However over the years a couple of governments have defaulted in bond payments e.g. Russia 1998 and Zimbabwe 
2008 to date. 




4.  Results and Analysis 
In this chapter an analysis of the data employed will be described, with the aim of illustrating 
and condensing the data used. This section will report on all the policy options used and how 
the impact pension benefits. Before discussing the results a report on the benchmark will be 
presented first, which will serves as the basis of the Malawi pension. The assumption is that 
in Malawi an average person retires by 50 years and the maximum age of death is 70. The 
average starting wage ranges from 65,000-75,000 Mk. The contribution rate is 15% of payroll 
with a transaction cost of 5% of wages. The common investment strategy is a 50-50-0-0-0 
approach, i.e. 50% of assets are allocated to bank deposits and government bonds 
respectively.  In addition we will look at the deccummulation model by using market 
inflation and interest rates to determine the monthly benefits expected to be received upon 
retirement.  Two scenarios will be in place. One is where a lump-sum of 40% is paid and 
60% is paid to an annuity. The second is where a 100% is invested in a pension annuity. Also 
the risk return analysis will be used by looking at performance of the portfolio’s riskiness. 
The following test will be used to measure risks; the Sharpe ratio, the Jensen measure and the 
Treynor measure. 
4.1 Simulation Results in the Basic Model 
This is the model discussed above with 15% contribution and 50-50-0-0-0. Table XI gives the 
simulation results of replacement rates with the basic model. The mean of our simulated 
replacement rates is 1.31%, with a standard deviation at 0.6% when the contribution rate is 
10%. When the contribution rate rises to 15% and 20% the replacement rates falls to 1.19% 
the replacement rate is low due to our assumptions that the 50% of the assets are allocated to 
banks and government assets. 1,000 replications are computed, since simulations generated 
random results by the computer, and thus we seek to obtain results as representative and/or 
accurate as possible. Despite the increase in contribution rates or transaction cost the 
replacement rate still is low. The only time the replacement rate is favourable is when the 




retirement age rises and this is favourable at retirement ages 60 and 65 where we have 
replacement rates of 27.29% and 22.80% with standard deviations of 12.06% and 15.12% 
respectively. Figure 6 clearly shows the distribution and gives us a visual image of how 
dispersed the results are of the replacement rate. The 1.2% replacement rate found above is 
very low, and apparently not sufficient to support a typical retiree’s post-retirement life. The 
deccumulation also favours the same result showing that a retiree at age 50 will not get 
enough monthly benefits that are just $43.20 while a retiree at 65 is likely to get $1441. Table 
XII indicates the results.  
4.2 Simulations Results for the Rest of the Portfolios 
4.2.1 Simulation Results Portfolio 1 
In this section we quantitatively measure the extent to which replacement rates 
respond to changes in three variables, i.e. the contribution rate, retirement age and transaction 
costs. In the first portfolio simulation, we change the contribution rates to a lower level at 
10%, and a higher level at 20% respectively. The portfolio is still replicated the results of the 
50-50-0-0-0 investment approach, i.e. 50% in bank deposits and 50% in bonds. The results 
indicated in Table XIII show that the replacement rate at 10% and 15% is just 1.26% with 
a coefficient of variation 2.155 and 2.229 respectively. While at 20% contribution rate the 
coefficient of variation is 2.229 with a replacement rate of 1.31%.  As the retirement age 
changes to 55, 60 and 65 with contribution rate of 15%. The replacement rates rises to 7.37%, 
33.62% and 45.78%, with corresponding coefficient of variation of 1.829, 1.607 and 0.694 
respectively. Just like the basic model the replacement rates are higher at age 60 and 65. 
Figure 7 shows just how the replacement rates are distributed with most of the clustering at 
0.0-0.1 and 0.3-0.5  




4.2.2 Simulation Results Portfolio 2 
In portfolio 2 the simulation, at contribution rates of 10% to 20%. The portfolio is still 
replicated the results of the 50-50-0-0-0 investment approach. The results indicated in Table 
XV show that the replacement rate are just 1.31% with the coefficient of variation 
0.317665146. When the retirement age rose to 55, 60 and 65 the replacement rates rises to 
7.72%, 24.94% and 21.84%, with corresponding coefficient of variation of 0.28047014, 
0.315620071 and 2.286851845 respectively. Just like the basic model the replacement rates 
are higher at age 60 and 65. Figure 8 indicates how the replacement rates are distributed with 
most of the clustering at 0.0-0.1 and 0.2-0.3 with corresponding frequencies of 8 and 2. 
4.2.3 Simulation Results Portfolio 3 
Portfolio 3 of the simulation, at contribution rates of 10%, 15% and 20%. The 
portfolio still replicates the results of the basic investment approach. The results are indicated 
in Table XVII and it shows that the replacement rate is just 1.32% with the coefficient of 
variation 0.30405129 for all rates. When the retirement age changes to 55, 60 and 65 the 
replacement rates rises to 7.83%, 35.37% and 38.73%, with corresponding coefficient of 
variation of 0.187706805, 0.310222723 and 0.563886378 respectively. Just like the basic 
model the replacement rates are higher at age 60 and 65. Figure 9 indicates the frequency of 
the replacement rates are with most of the clustering at 0.0-0.1.  
4.2.4 Simulation Results Portfolio 4 
In this simulation when contribution rates are 10%, 15% and 20%. The portfolio is 
still replicating the results of the basic investment approach. The results are indicated in 
Table XIX and it shows that the replacement rate is just 1.35% with the coefficient of 
variation 0.218036416 for all rates. When the retirement age changes to 55, 60 and 65 the 
replacement rates rises to 3.64%, 35.83% and 19.10% with corresponding coefficient of 
variation of 0.280660206, 0.300379866 and 4.1044647 respectively. The replacement rates 




are highest at age 60 and 65 but the rest of it is very low. Figure 10 indicates the frequency of 
the replacement rates are with most of at low rates of 0.0-0.05 and the highest at 0.35-0.4. 
4.2.5 Simulation Results Portfolio 5 
With contribution rates of 10%, 15% and 20%, the results are indicated in Table XXI 
and it shows that the replacement rate is just 1.28% for all rates with the coefficients of 
variations 3.142317367, 20.13593547 and 3.142317367 respectively. When the retirement 
age changes to 55, 60 and 65 the replacement rates rises to 7.45%, 34.30% and 25.37% with 
corresponding coefficient of variation of 2.839548698, 2.612720892 and 3.1619790 
respectively. The replacement rates are highest at age 60 and 65 but the rest of it is very low. 
As for the frequency of the replacement rates Figure 11 indicates the frequency of the 
replacement rates are with most of at low rates of 0.0-0.1 and the highest at 0.2-0.4. 
4.2.6 Simulation Results Portfolio 6 
At contribution rates are 10%, 15% and 20%, the results indicated in Table XXIII 
show that the replacement rate is just 1.29% for all rates, with the coefficients of variations 
0.543913352, 0.218036416 and 0.543913352 respectively. When the retirement age changes 
to 55, 60 and 65 the replacement rates rises to 7.28%, 35.27% and 45.78% with 
corresponding coefficient of variation of 0.226287954, 0.325636759 and 1.207584452 
respectively. The replacement rates are highest at age 60 and 65 but the rest of it is very low. 
As for the frequency of the replacement rates Figure 12 indicates the frequency of the 
replacement rates are with most of at low rates of 0.0-0.1 and the highest at 0.3-0.5. 
4.3 Conclusion of the Simulations 
When we specify a higher contribution, i.e. 20% contribution rate, the person is 
expected to have would have a wealthier retirement life, but according to our findings the 
replacement rate doesn’t rise in most cases it remains constant. The simulation results here 
are mainly used to demonstrate the quantitative effects of changing a particular variable on 




replacement rates, thus serving as empirical evidence supporting any potential policy 
modifications. But in our case this doesn’t support potential policy modifications meaning 
that the rise in contribution rates is not ideal for Malawi.  
The second simulation relates to changes in the retirement age or the pensionable age and it 
presents same results as in the OECD (2005d) study. For this work we considered 3 cases; 
with retirement at the age of 55, 60 and 65. Rising the retirement age further to 65 and even 
more is highly debated in many countries, mainly in OECD countries. The justification is that 
since people live longer due to medical improvement, it is natural to require people to retire 
later, and it is indeed one of most effective ways to tackle the issue of an ageing population 
(PPI 2003; Turner 2005). By rising the retirement age in Malawi, the person could have a 
higher replacement rates with a 15% contribution rates and is expected to have a wealthier 
life upon retirement. The results are consistent with findings in Friedman et al (1996), Hu 
(2006) and the OECD (2005). This is attributed mainly to the long term horizon of pension 
fund management and planning, but the problem arises to the issue of average mortality rate 
in Malawi being 54.14 (figure 14). This means that most retiree will not receive high returns 
from their pension benefits, when they retire at 50 and unfortunately most retire at that age. 
This then raises the issue of what is the appropriate measure to deal with the issue of early 
mortality. 
4.4 Results of the Pension Annuity Benefits 
A Pension Annuity provides a person with a guaranteed income for the rest of your 
life upon retirement. The benefits are that the retiree is guaranteed prosperous life when one 
retires. This however can be affected by poor investment strategies and low annuity rates. 
This study uses inflation adjusted annuity with interest rate of 20% and inflation rate of 25%. 
These rates are chosen since they are the current average interest and inflation rates in 
Malawi. These gives the following results: in portfolios 1 an individual at age 50 accumulates 




total pensions that correlate to the findings of the simulated results. Portfolio 1 is represented 
in table XIV. In the table the expected benefits at age 50 are low with monthly annuities of 
MK 20,565.15 (USD 55.48) and maximum at age 65 of MK268,908.26 (USD 726.78) when 
pensions are invested at 100%. Meaning that the only age with higher earning is age 65. 
Table XVI gives the expected annuity result for portfolio 2. This table performed better. With 
monthly benefits of MK41,231.64 ($111.44), MK54,782.32 ($148.06), MK290,130.65 
($784.14) and MK568,400.00 ($1,536.22) for ages 50,55,60 and 65 respectively. These 
results are higher than the low replacement rate at age 50 and 55. This could be attributed to 
the fact that this portfolio invests in government bonds that are considered riskless. Table 
XVIII includes results for portfolio 3 in this table annuity incomes for age 50, 55, 60 and 65 
are MK228,500.67, MK351,249.90, MK523,444.22 and MK636,332.24 respectively. This 
portfolio performed better as well due to the fact that the investment is in T bills which are 
administered by governments and are mostly risk free and have high returns with low risk. 
The results for portfolio 4 are presented in table 20. This portfolio doesn’t provide desirable 
annuities for early retirement with low values of MK8,986.67 ($24.29) at age 50 and high 
values at age 65 of MK148,810.15 ($402.19). These low results could be attributed to that 
fact that the investment is made in the local market and this market is characterised by overall 
poor economic performance as indicated in chapter 3. For portfolio 5, table XXII records the 
results. The results are low at age 50 of MK14,099.36 ($38.11) and highest being age 65 with 
values of MK143,193.66 ($387.01). This portfolio is not ideal for investment since it 
provides low pension benefits. This can be attributed to low international investment 
allocation in the economy due economic regulations put in place on global investments. 
Lastly table XXIV records the annuity results for portfolio 6 which is a naïve portfolio which 
invest 20% in each portfolio presenting investment diversification. The values are as follows 




the lowest being at age 50 is MK30,551.38 ($82.57) and the highest at age 65 is 
MK658,709.62 ($1,780.30).  
4.5 Risk Return Analysis Results 
Since aim of this study is to find out if the pension reform is ideal for Malawi. One way of 
identifying this is by looking at the asset allocation schemes of a policy. Modern portfolio 
theory(MPT) argues that if we treat single-period returns for various securities as random 
variables, we can assign them expected values, standard deviations and correlations. Based 
on these, we can calculate the expected return and volatility (standard deviation) of any 
portfolio constructed with those securities. We may treat volatility and expected return as 
proxies for risk and reward. That is a portfolio with high returns and ultimately low risks.  
Hence for each portfolio it is necessary to study return risk on pension funds. Table XXV 
provides the statistical properties of all seven portfolios with 44 observations each, 
representing the maximum amount of years one is expected to work. The first two columns 
provide estimated portfolio returns and as expected they underperformed. In addition all 
funds registered a lower volatility. This is not surprising since majority of the portfolios are 
invested in low risk assets (i.e. bonds, tbill ….) while the market risk is composed of other 
risky assets like stocks and shares which add more risk due to constant fluctuations. This 
implies that retirement saving don’t provide significant retirement wealth nor need large 
investments amounts. As a consequence retirement saving need to apply their investment 
elsewhere like the in pension certificates and capital guaranteed contracts.  
 More technically, MPT models an asset's return as a normally distributed function 
with the risk and the mean being the determinants. By looking at the mean and the risk it is 





 moments are calculated. This is presented in table XXV in columns 9 records 






 which is a measure of symmetry and 10 records the kurtosis which is a 
measure that looks at the extent of outliers, where very high and low returns occur. In the 
table portfolio 2,3,4, 6 and 7 have very high kurtosis. This indicates that the models with high 
kurtosis will give either very high or very low returns in the long run. While 1 and 5 have low 
kurtosis indicating investments with very few high and low returns. Financial theory indicates 
that investors are risk averse and would want to invest in portfolios that provide a sure return. 
As a result investors would invest in portfolios with low to negative kurtosis that would 
provide better returns and in our case 1 and 5 are those portfolios however as shown in the 
annuity table these portfolios do not provide adequate income.  
 To test for normality the JarqueBera test
6
, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
7
 
(ADF test) and the Durbin-Watson stat
8
 are calculated. The JB test for normality of the 
portfolio returns in this thesis uses an   equal to 0.05 the critical value is 5.99. In our results 
our calculated statistics are higher than the critical value for all portfolios, the study then fails 
to accept the null hypothesis of normality. This is supported by figure 13 which gives the 
returns of the distribution and each has a defining distribution. 
 To earn returns that are less risky or volatile it is important to have returns that are 
stationary; this will imply that the returns will provide positive earnings in the long run. The 
ADF test reveals that all portfolios are stationary when considering at 5% significant level 
                                                          
5
Positive skewness indicates a portfolio is skewed to the right of the mean and negative skewness indicates a 
portfolio is skewed the left of the mean. Investor and investment managers are often willing to invest in 
portfolios with negative returns so long as it has positive skewness. Since this implies that the return is 
clustered to the right of the mean indicating high returns in the long term. 
6
The JarqueBera test is calculated as JB=   
 
 
          
  
         
 
 . It´s test statistic can be compared with a  
χ (chi-square) distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. 
7
 The augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF) is a test for a unit root in a time series sample. The statistic, used in 
the test, is a negative number. The more negative it is, the stronger the rejection of the hypothesis that there 
is a unit roots at some level of confidence. 
8
Durbin–Watson statistic is a test statistic used to detect the presence of autocorrelation (a relationship 
between values separated from each other by a given time lag) in the residuals (prediction errors) from a 
regression analysis.  




what this means is that all returns are derived from the same distribution and can provide 
positive returns in the long run. 
 It is important to test if there is existence of autocorrelation in the portfolio returns. 
This is the case because if returns are auto correlated what it implies is that poor current 
returns will leads to poor future returns and vice versa. In table XXV, column 15 presents the 
results of the Durbin-Watson test. In the test we reject the null at 5% confidence level 
indicating that a portfolio that performs well today is likely to perform well in the long run. 
4.5.1 Analysis of Jensen, Sharpe ratio and Treynor ratios 
 Table XXV shows that, the portfolios have positive Jensen measures, Sharpe and 
Treynor ratios. However these values are extremely low and somewhat negative in portfolio 
5. What this means is that the majority of the portfolios will perform well in the future and 
provide positive returns. However these returns will be extremely low and will not provide 
maximum benefits due to their poor ratios/measure. What this implies is that investment 
managers hold risk free assets, and this leads to portfolios that provide guaranteed returns to 
the firms while providing low returns to the beneficiaries.  
4.7 Problems with the Portfolio Measures 
 Investors and investment manager´s aim is to earn superior returns. However 
experience shows that high returns doesn’t necessarily mean high pension benefits. This is 
the case because fully funded pension plans do not provide pension benefits to pensioners 
alone, but also provide strong externalities that benefit the overall economy (Reisen, 2000).  
 Pension benefits are aimed at providing income upon retirement. In this thesis we 
observed that despite investing in high earning returns the overall accumulation wasn’t so 
favourable for other portfolio. This could be due to other risk that the portfolios didn’t look at 
like management risk, mortality risk, inflation risk and interest rate risk. Positive movements 
of the portfolio returns may affect the schemes investment strategy as well as overestimate 




the performance of a portfolio. Contractual savings can improve the mitigation of firms’ and 
banks’ financial risks by increasing the availability of long term funds to them. Firms tend to 
supply more long term debt and banks tend to engage in more maturity transformation. In 
capital market based financial systems firms tend to overestimate returns to attract more 
businesses with the aim earning more funds for long term loans and this may lead poor 
portfolio performance since it doesn’t reflect reality of the market. 
 Performance measures follow a normal distribution function. It assumes that 
portfolios riskiness and performance can be determined by the standard deviation and mean. 
This may lead to results that are biased in this study all the portfolios had very low standard 
deviation and positive returns. For a risk adverse investor this may indicate that the portfolio 
returns would be positive and guaranteed. But calculating the expected future annuity most of 
the portfolios performed poorly with low benefits close to $44 a month. The Sharpe ratio 
hence fails to actually estimate the true level of risk, since it only focuses on a mean variance 
analysis. The evidence of the Durbin Watson tests suggest that the portfolios are correlated 
that once a portfolio performs well today it will perform well in the future. But this may lead 
to underestimation of the standard deviation of returns. 
 Lastly risk free assets may lead to misleading assumptions and results. The average 
returns from bond and T bill investments have also been historically lower, than average 
stock market returns. This allows investment managers to earn high returns. However not all 









 This thesis studied the benefits, limitations, operations and expected performance of 
the pension reform in ensuring retirement income, reducing government pension debt and 
improving macroeconomic instability. Malawi recently moved from a PAYG pension system 
to a private mandatory DC. The aim of this is to provide retirement income and improve 
macroeconomic stability. However this is hampered by macroeconomic fluctuations and the 
instability of the financial sector which negatively affected pension fund management. The 
real value of their reserves has been eroded through high inflation rates and the channelling 
of resources into politically motivated low-yield investment and loans. With this in mind the 
study indicated the following: 
1. The performance of the pension accumulating was only adequate in portfolios that are 
risk free i.e. bonds and T bills. These portfolios are sure to provide adequate 
retirement income. However the rest did not do well when it came to pension income. 
This is because all pension schemes in Malawi suffer from a series of significant 
weaknesses reflecting deficiencies in their design, in their financing and in their 
administration. These deficiencies have not only been exposed but aggravated by the 
economic crisis and the radical measures necessary to face its structural causes.  
2. The replacement rates for all portfolios were very low below the increasing the 
contribution rate did nothing to increase the replacement rates rather increasing the 
retirement age to 60 or 65 did. This is a problem for Malawi since the average life 
expectancy is 54.14 years (figure 14). Meaning that when the pension reform was 
being considered they overestimated the life expectancy, assuming that the Malawi 
population will live longer in the future. This then would only beneficial to late retiree 
and detrimental to early ones. Malawi needs to restructure its social protection system 
to correspond and complement both issues. 




3. Risk analysis generated low returns which corresponded to low future income 
benefits. Despite their positive performance in the end they do not provide adequate 
income. This is the result of a combination of factors: low contributions due to the 
failure to adjust the ceiling, high inflation rates, and low-yielding investments guided 
mostly by political considerations, and an interest rate policy which gave members 
negative real rates of return over an extended period of time.  
4. There was lack of enough information on the market data and pension data. This 
hence could have affected the pension findings. 
5. State policy seems in favour of the reform aims to improve macroeconomic stability. 
This may bias individual’s savings as they may be forced to invest in portfolios that 
are less diversified and provide low yields i.e. T bills while providing financial 
resources to governments.  
6. The contribution rate is usually fixed but because the final balance and the annuity 
depend on financial markets there is some uncertainty as to the final level of the 
pension benefit. In Malawi, a defined contribution system cannot by itself be expected 
to produce an adequate pension for those with low life-time earnings or for those who 
have broken periods of employment. If a minimum benefit level is to be achieved, the 
system would have to be complemented by a government backed minimum pension 
guarantee. 
The main problems affecting the management of occupational pension schemes in general 
are lack of legislation, regulation and supervision of occupational pension schemes, a lack 
of secure and profitable investment opportunities which explains why the portfolios of all 
private pension funds consist only of Treasury Bills and real estate, and a lack of qualified 
management personnel.  If the pension reform is to prosper Macroeconomic stability is a 




crucial condition for the functioning of any pension scheme or social security system. 
Under the circumstances of strong macroeconomic fluctuations and high or volatile 
inflation rates, it is extremely difficult to maintain the financial stability of a pension 
system. The study therefore was biased since it was working with returns that were 
affected by these flaws. 
What is required for the Pension funds in Malawi to perform well with the low life 
expectancy and poor financial markets is to encourage an open ended pension portfolio 
scheme. So that the pensioners can benefit from better performing and sophisticated 
financial markets e.g. the international market. Another option can also be investing the 
local stock market that is managed by the Malawi stock exchange. This would help 
diversify the pension fund portfolio more and also increase the pension benefits, such that 
retiring early could be possible.  
Financial markets in countries which are macro economically unstable, and have a low 
level of development typically do not offer adequate investment instruments to protect 
against such fluctuations. Whether benefits are paid out as pensions, lump-sums or 
annuities, they are eroded quickly. Without macroeconomic stability, pension systems can 
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  (MK) Budget (MK) Funding (MK) (MK) % 
2004/05 
      
2,106,220,000  
          
2,106,220,000  
       
2,106,220,000  
                                 
-    100 
2005/06 
      
3,208,000,000  
          
3,208,000,000  
       
3,208,000,000  
                                 
-    100 
2006/07 
      
4,763,000,000  
          
4,763,000,000  
       
4,763,000,000  
                                 
-    100 
2007/08 
      
5,500,000,000  
          
5,500,000,000  
       
5,500,000,000  
                                 
-    
                
100  
2008/09 
      
6,450,000,000  
          
5,450,000,000  
       
5,500,000,000  
             
950,000,000  
                   
84  
2009/10 
      
7,400,000,000  
          
6,900,000,000  
       
6,900,000,000  
             
500,000,000  
                   
93  
2010/11 
      
7,400,000,000  
          
7,600,000,000  
       
9,721,341,887  - 2,321,341,887  
                
103  
2011/2012 
    
12,000,000,000  
        
11,000,000,000  
     
10,446,573,605  
          
1,553,426,395  
                   
92  
2012/2013 
    
18,698,419,430  
        
15,698,419,430  
     
15,698,419,430  
          
3,000,000,000  
                   
84  


















Table II: Malawi National Statistics 
 
MARKETS
CURRENCY 329 330 Jun-13 Monthly
GDP
GDP 5.7 5.05 USD Billion Dec-11 Yearly
GDP ANNUAL
GROWTH RATE 5 5.8 Percent Dec-12 Yearly
GDP PER CAPITA 187.42 185.12 USD Dec-11 Yearly
GDP PER CAPITA
PPP 918.3 882.89 USD Dec-11 Yearly
LABOUR
POPULATION 15.38 14.9 Million Dec-11 Yearly
UNEMPLOYMEN




(CPI) 127.2 129.9 Index Points Apr-13 Monthly
INFLATION RATE 35.8 36.4 Percent Apr-13 Monthly
MONEY
INTEREST RATE 25 25 Percent Jun-13 Monthly
TRADE
BALANCE OF
TRADE -34041.3 -26808.4 million MWK Sep-12 Monthly
CURRENT 
ACCOUNT -119687.5 -136214.8 million MWK Dec-11 Yearly
CURRENT 
ACCOUNT TO
GDP -18.5 -18.1 Percent Dec-12 Yearly
EXPORTS 41926 35918 million MWK Sep-12 Monthly







DEBT TO GDP 16.3 16.9 percent Dec-11 Yearly
GOVERNMENT 




PRODUCTION 25.28 55.19 percent Dec-11 Monthly
FREQUENCYLAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE
FREQUENCY
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE FREQUENCY
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE
FREQUENCY
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE FREQUENCY
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE
FREQUENCY
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE FREQUENCY
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE
LAST PREVIOUS TREND UNIT REFERENCE FREQUENCY




Source: Trading economics and RBM 
Table III: Population of Labour Force 
 


































1990 3737000 171035 0.12% 3565965 2.43% 583911 52087 8.92% 531824 91.08%
1991 3832000 175383 0.06% 3656617 1.17% 607950 53411 8.79% 554539 91.21%
1992 3879000 177534 0.02% 3701466 0.49% 629452 54066 8.59% 575386 91.41%
1993 3899000 178449 0.02% 3720551 0.47% 648853 54345 8.38% 594508 91.62%
1994 3918000 179319 0.05% 3738681 0.95% 666990 54610 8.19% 612380 91.81%
1995 3957000 181104 0.07% 3775896 1.54% 684586 55153 8.06% 629433 91.94%
1996 4021000 184033 0.10% 3836967 2.02% 701442 56045 7.99% 645397 92.01%
1997 4106000 187923 0.11% 3918077 2.30% 717543 57230 7.98% 660313 92.02%
1998 4205000 192454 0.17% 4012546 3.59% 734031 58610 7.98% 675421 92.02%
1999 4363000 199686 0.93% 4163314 19.30% 752398 60812 8.08% 691586 91.92%
2000 5245561 240079 0.17% 5005482 3.54% 773641 73114 9.45% 700527 90.55%
2001 5440188 248987 0.17% 5191201 3.65% 798349 75826 9.50% 722523 90.50%
2002 5648198 258507 0.18% 5389691 3.72% 826084 78726 9.53% 747358 90.47%
2003 5868583 268593 0.18% 5599990 3.73% 855545 81797 9.56% 773748 90.44%
2004 6097967 279092 0.18% 5818875 3.68% 884847 84995 9.61% 799852 90.39%
2005 6332984 289848 0.14% 6043136 3.01% 912638 88270 9.67% 824368 90.33%
2006 6532976 299001 0.09% 6233975 1.92% 938454 91058 9.70% 847396 90.30%
2007 6664520 305022 0.19% 6359498 3.96% 962748 92891 9.65% 869857 90.35%
2008 6940911 317672 0.13% 6623239 2.71% 986182 84056 8.52% 902126 91.48%
2009 7137848 326685 0.14% 6811163 2.91% 1009810 101793 10.08% 908017 89.92%
2010 7355454 336644 0.14% 7018810 2.86% 1034380 105837 10.23% 928543 89.77%
2011 7575758 346727 -0.52% 7229031 -10.93% 1060066 137505 12.97% 922561 87.03%
2012 6708275 307024 -4.58% 6401250 -95.42% 1084550 148789 13.72% 935761 86.28%
Total Pension Funds
administrator 2011 2010 2009
Nico Life 302 113 108
Old mutual Life 401 154 167
Vanguard Life 52 30 35
Inde Trust 102 90 96
Segredated funds 13 12 12
Other 20 0 0
Total 899 399 218
Source RBM Annual Report 2011




Table V:  Private Pension members 
 
 
Table VI:  Private Pension Contributions 
 
 






administrator 2011 2010 2009
Nico Life 26343 18012 15875
Old mutual Life 44558 27352 26916
Vanguard Life 1791 1127 1173
Inde Trust 15716 15067 14314
Segredated funds 13311 12279 12515
Other 786 0 0
Total 102505 73837 70793
Source RBM Annual Report 2011
Pension contributions      MK millions
administrator 2011 2010 2009
Nico Life 2083.1 1768.9 1191.1
Old mutual Life 3358 2020.2 2048.4
Vanguard Life 65.3 30.4 26.6
Inde Trust 682.7 558.8 443.9
Segredated funds 2394.7 1454.1 1776.5
Other 7 0 0
Total 8590.4 5832.4 5486.5
Source RBM Annual Report 2011
Pension Asset     MK millions
administrator 2011 2010 2009
Nico Life 16538.9 18043.7 15126.5
Old mutual Life 17059.7 13412.8 11160.5
Vanguard Life 222 179.2 150.5
Inde Trust 6852.4 6052.2 5434.5
Segredated funds 26986.4 21824.9 20120.9
Other 7 0 0
Total 67666.4 59512.8 51992.9
Source RBM Annual Report 2011





Table VIII: Macroeconomic Returns 
 























1981 0 2.75 9.3 0 0 0 0
1982 0 2.75 9.7 0 0 0 0
1983 0 2.75 10.3 0 0 0 0
1984 0 2.75 10.6 0 0 0 0
1985 0 2.75 11.5 0 0 0 0
1986 0 2.75 11.5 0 0 0 0
1987 0 2.75 11.5 0 0 90549.30 0
1988 0 2.75 11.5 15.8 0 17440000.00 0
1989 0 2.75 11.5 15.8 0 9290000.00 0
1990 11.857 2.75 11.5 12.9 0 23300000.00 3.935
1991 8.227 2.75 11.5 11.5 0 -28700000.00 4.43
1992 23.236 2.75 12 15.6 0 -7100000.00 4.203
1993 22.77 2.75 20.9 23.5 2014392000.000 8000000.00 4.712
1994 34.657 2.75 23.5 27.7 2714458000.000 24992617.90 4.315
1995 83.148 2.75 38.6 46.3 2645921000.000 5643045.60 5.014
1996 37.733 2.75 42.7 30.8 3078744000.000 15797661.10 5.619
1997 9.137 2.75 39.3 18.3 3449381000.000 14868714.40 6.095
1998 29.779 2.75 39.5 33 3400685000.000 12104230.40 6.23
1999 44.759 2.75 39.5 42.9 5029547000.000 58528206.30 6.545
2000 27.247 2.75 0 39.5 8028999000.000 25999996.40 6.739
2001 17.43 2.75 0 42.4 13175489000.000 19299991.10 6.605
2002 9.586 2.75 0 41.7 23754467000.000 5899999.40 6.826
2003 11.424 2.75 0 39.3 28782933000.000 83151292.60 7.355
2004 15.464 2.75 0 28.6 36549563884.000 129706673.00 8.118
2005 13.904 2.75 0 24.4 41209791708.000 139696707.40 8.268
2006 7.961 2.75 0 19.3 47099914232.000 35561531.60 8.712
2007 8.71 2.75 38.75 13.9 56996678985.000 124388838.70 9.815
2008 8.427 2.75 38 11.3 157106818700.000 195424461.10 10.869
2009 7.41 2.75 38 10.1 213802305760.000 49130854.80 11.976
2010 7.6 2.75 38 10.93 243612590260.000 97010028.40 13.403
2011 7.8 2.75 0 12.15 334319714010.000 92407703.50 13.98
2012 18.6 2.75 0 14.58
Mean 20.2985 2.75 16.53594 18.95742 39573303017 37159132.35 5.57325
Median 13.904 2.75 11.5 15.8 3078744000 15797661.1 5.857
std deviation 17.494 0 15.57464 14.93739 82294573350 52723849.18 4.474283




Table IX: Average salaries 2011/2012 Financial year 
 







Blue Color 15479 44.22571429
Blue Color 17618.04 50.33725714
Blue Color 18499.14 52.85468571
Blue Color 19380.24 55.37211429
Blue Color 21225.6 60.64457143
Blue Color 21756 62.16
Blue Color 25798 73.70857143
Blue Color 27719.34 79.19811429
Blue Color 28407.72 81.16491429
Blue Color 29118 83.19428571
Blue Color 36455.2 104.1577143
Blue Color 37637 107.5342857
Blue Color 38619.36 110.3410286
Blue Color 45541 130.1171429
Blue Color 48157 137.5914286
Blue Color 50338.08 143.8230857
Blue Color 51680.64 147.6589714
Blue Color 53559 153.0257143
Blue Color 61226 174.9314286
Entry Level Graduate 65972 188.4914286
Entry Level Graduate 70802.16 202.2918857
Entry Level Graduate 83896.8 239.7051429
Entry Level Graduate 85994 245.6971429
Entry Level Graduate 98997.36 282.8496
Entry Level Graduate 122908 351.1657143
Entry Level Graduate 161920 462.6285714
Entry Level Graduate 165968 474.1942857
Entry Level Graduate 228808.8 653.7394286
Entry Level Graduate 234529 670.0828571
Entry Level Graduate 251689.2 719.112
Senior Position 296604 847.44
Senior Position 304019 868.6257143




















Table XI: Changes in Contribution rate, transaction rates and retirement age 
 
Table XII: Annuity benefits 
 
 
Table XIII: Changes in Contribution rate, transaction rates and retirement age 
portfolio 1 
 
Portifolio 7 changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 50-50-0-0-0 50-50-0-0-0 50-50-0-0-0 50-50-0-0-0 50-50-0-0-050-50-0-0-050-50-0-0-0 50-50-0-0-0 50-50-0-0-050-50-0-0-0
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.31% 1.19% 1.19% 1.19% 5.46% 27.29% 22.80% 1.19% 1.19% 1.19%
std dev 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 3.15% 12.06% 15.12% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60%
coefficient of variation 2.18 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.74 2.26 3.4463152 2.00 2.00 2.00







Py50 148075684.1 15,985.50   43.20            9,591.30      25.92      
py55 696910957.6 75,234.98 203.34          45,140.99    122.00    
Py60 785248108.9 84,771.41 229.11          50,862.85    137.47    
Py65 4939212272 533,212.38 1,441.11      319,927.43  864.67    
Portifolio 1 changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0 100-0-0-0-0
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.26% 1.26% 1.31% 1.26% 7.37% 33.62% 45.78% 1.26% 1.31% 1.31%
std dev 2.72% 2.68% 2.92% 2.68% 13.44% 54.03% 31.79% 2.68% 2.87% 2.87%
coefficient of variation 2.15488884 2.11740966 2.22879758 2.117409658 1.82440428 1.60721408 0.694362886 2.117409658 2.1886358 2.18863578




Table XIV: Annuity benefits portfolio 1 
 
















Py50 7731495 20,565.15   55.58           12,339.09      33.35           
py55 10916234.2 42,518.03   114.91         25,510.82      68.95           
Py60 15144566.9 94,674.99   255.88         56,804.99      153.53        
Py65 22085115.6 268,908.26 726.78         161,344.96    436.07        
Portifolio 2changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0-0
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.31% 1.23% 1.31% 1.23% 7.72% 24.94% 21.84% 1.23% 1.23% 1.23%
std dev 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 2.17% 7.87% 49.95% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42%
coefficient of variation 0.317665146 0.342060597 0.317665146 0.342060597 0.28047014 0.31562007 2.28685185 0.342060597 0.3420606 0.3420606





Py50 2,719,667.37                41,231.64             111.44                 24,738.98          66.86            
py55 34,520,578.20              54,782.32             148.06                 32,869.39          88.84            
Py60 357,773,040.31            290,130.65           784.14                 174,078.39        470.48         
Py65 986,804,690.20            568,400.00           1,536.22             341,040.00        921.73         




Table XVII: Changes in Contribution rate, transaction rates and retirement age 
portfolio 3 
 
Table XVIII: Annuity benefits portfolio 3 
 






portifolio 3 changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 0-0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0-00-0-100-0-00-0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0-00-0-100-0-0
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.32% 1.32% 1.32% 1.32% 7.83% 35.37% 38.73% 1.32% 1.32% 1.32%
std dev 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 1.47% 10.97% 21.84% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40%
coefficient of variation 0.30405129 0.30405129 0.30405129 0.30405129 0.187706805 0.310223 0.563886 0.30405129 0.304051 0.30405129





Py50 85905122.55 228,500.67      617.57             137,100.40           370.54               
py55 90181187.66 351,249.90      949.32             210,749.94           569.59               
Py60 115724856.8 523,444.22      1,414.71         314,066.53           848.83               
Py65 134390020.8 636,332.24      1,719.82         381,799.35           1,031.89           
portifolio 4 changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100-0
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.35% 1.35% 1.35% 1.35% 3.64% 35.83% 19.10% 1.35% 1.35% 1.35%
std dev 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 1.02% 10.76% 78.41% 0.30% 0.30% 0.002953944
coefficient of variation 0.218036416 0.218036416 0.218036416 0.218036416 0.280660206 0.300379866 4.1044647 0.218036416 0.21803642 0.218036416




Table XX: Annuity benefits portfolio 4 
 
















Py50 3,378,550.62       8,986.67                   24.29                 5,392.00       14.57             
py55 5,806,873.08       22,617.40                 61.13                 13,570.44     36.68             
Py60 8,790,479.90       54,952.95                 148.52               32,971.77     89.11             
Py65 12,221,600.85     148,810.15              402.19               89,286.09     241.31           
portifolio 5 changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100 0-0-0-0-100
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 7.45% 34.30% 25.37% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28%
std dev 4.01% 25.71% 4.01% 25.71% 21.16% 89.60% 80.23% 25.71% 4.01% 4.01%
coefficient of variation 3.14231737 20.13593547 3.14231737 20.13593547 2.839548698 2.61272089 3.1619790 20.1359355 3.142317367 3.14231737







Py50 5300673 14,099.36        38.11      8,459.62       22.86      
py55 6864578 26,737.09        72.26      16,042.25     43.36      
Py60 8727730 54,560.67        147.46    32,736.40     88.48      
Py65 11760325 143,193.66      387.01    85,916.19     232.21    








Table XXIV: Annuity benefits portfolio 6 
 






portifolio 6 changes in contribution, transaction and retirement age 
contribution rate retirement age Transaction cost
retirement age 50 50 50 50 55 60 65 50 50 50
contribution rate 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
investment strategy 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20 20-20-20-20-20
Transaction cost 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15
Replacement rates
mean 1.29% 1.29% 1.29% 1.29% 7.28% 35.27% 45.78% 1.29% 1.29% 1.29%
std dev 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 1.65% 11.48% 55.29% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70%
coefficient of variation 0.543913352 0.218036416 0.543913352 0.543913352 0.226287954 0.325636759 1.207584452 0.218036416 0.543913352 0.543913352







Py50 11485832.61 30,551.38      82.57           18,330.83   49.54             
py55 31266039.22 121,779.20   329.13        73,067.52   197.48           
Py60 46220647.54 288,944.49   780.93        173,366.70 468.56           
Py65 54099037.68 658,709.62   1,780.30     395,225.77 1,068.18       
Portfolio average std sharpe treynor jensen median maximum minimum skewness kurtosis JB test p value ADF test Durbin-Watson stat p value
1 0.022727 0.016 0.015 0.005 2E-04 0.017763 0.06007 0.0052485 0.859029 -0.35375 26.03 0.00000 -2.931408 3.39224821 0.0000000
2 0.022727 0.099 1.533 0.396 0.152 1.7E-05 0.506643 9.374E-08 4.551778 19.7981 669.3 1.000000 8.9567682 2.503912299 0.0000000
3 0.022727 0.13 1.363 0.423 0.177 5.15E-06 0.843463 3.9E-08 6.33542 40.8208 2917 1.000000 3.8822791 2.399996667 0.0000000
4 0.023256 0.064 0.691 0.268 0.044 6.5E-06 0.279436 7.364E-08 3.172116 9.71128 156.4 1.000000 11.77472 1.069729318 0.0000000
5 0.023031 0.011 -24.59 -0.283 -0.265 0.020445 0.050021 0.0099576 0.909674 0.13325 21.14 1.000000 3.3214337 1.776234618 0.0003693
6 0.023256 0.091 2.084 0.38 0.189 0.000221 0.580687 2.7E-06 5.824703 35.9007 2233 0.99277 0.8078525 2.071635329 0.0000000
7 0.022727 0.08 3.307 0.393 0.265 0.000874 0.39797 2.96E-05 4.332301 18.1226 556.9 1.000000 5.5722632 2.369280142 0.0000000




Annex 2: Figures 
Figure 1: GDP Growth Rate 
 
 
Source: RBM, Ministry of Labour and NSO 
 











Figure 3: Returns on Investments 
 












Figure 6: Replacement rate disbursements 
 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 13: Returns Distribution using Johnson SB 
Portfolio 1: Bank deposits     
 



















Sample Size Sample Size
Statistic Statistic
P-Value Rank
Rank a 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01
a 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01 Critical Value 1.3749 1.9286 2.5018 3.2892 3.9074
Critical Value 0.15796 0.18053 0.20056 0.22426 0.2406 Reject? No No No No No






a 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01
Critical Value 7.2893 9.2364 11.07 13.388 15.086
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Portfolio 4: Domestic Equity 
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Figure 14: Life expectancy at Birth 
 
 
Source: Malawi National Statistics Office (NSO) 
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